Mid Term Evaluation of ActionAid's Emergency Response Programme

1st August 2012

Submitted to ActionAid International Emergencies and Conflict Team (IECT)

INTEGRITY | RESEARCH & CONSULTANCY

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Abbreviations

AAIK	ActionAid International Kenya
ALPS	Accountability Learning and Planning system
ASAL	Arid Semi Arid Land
DEC	Disaster Emergency Committee
DSG	District Steering Group
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
IECT	International Emergencies and Conflict Team
IPAT	International Project Accountability Team
KCDRP	Kenya Comprehensive Drought Resilience Programme
KFSSG	Kenya Food Security Steering Group
LRP	Local Rights Programme
PAT	(Kenya) Project Accountability Team
RTE	Real Time Evaluation

1. Executive Summary

In 2011 ActionAid International Kenya (AAIK) responded to a drought in the Horn of Africa considered to be the worst to afflict the country in over 60 years. The Government of Kenya declared the drought a national disaster and highlighted the humanitarian crisis, particularly in the northern part of the country.

AAIK responded to the drought by designing the two-phase Kenya Comprehensive Drought Resilience Programme (KCDRP). Focussing on building resilience is seen by ActionAid and other humanitarian agencies as the most effective way to respond to disasters worsened by climate change and structural vulnerability in terms of meeting immediate needs and addressing underlying causes. The KCDRP was designed within this framework with the first phase designed to provide relief to overcome the immediate humanitarian crisis, and the second phase to build resilience amongst the communities to be better able to cope with future disasters.

The programme was intended to be implemented in 14 areas (one area was dropped because of insecurities), where AAIK was already working and where the drought was considered the most severe. AAIK's initiatives were coordinated closely with the national Kenyan response and hence followed the government's response plan.

AAIK works from a rights based approach and the comprehensive programme was designed in such a way as to recognise rights violations and denials of rights in the long term. This design, along with a rights based humanitarian phase, and a longer term more development focused approach, has facilitated some important internal discussions around how to deliver emergency response within a rights based framework.

1.1 Evaluation objective

The overall purpose of the evaluation as stated in the ToR was to:

a) Assess whether AAIK's short-term response has served the agreed intended purpose in the Drought Response Framework, while considering effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, value for money and impact.

b) Map those aspects of the response that went well and identify which areas require improvement based on major programmatic, funding and organisational learning.

1.2 Key Issues

This evaluation finds that there is room for improvement for enhancing the approach, but that some important seeds have been planted for improved

implementation in the future, access to livelihood have been improved and in the most successful intervention components, the programme is contributing to building community resilience. At a political level the programme has contributed to improving government policies for future emergencies and enhanced the transparency of its responses for the benefit of the Kenyan people.

During the evaluation it was emphasised by senior management and the programme managers that the evaluation was a tool to revisit and improve the programme, and to learn how AAIK can better handle emergency responses in the future. The evaluator has therefore approached this evaluation by highlighting those areas with room for improvement as well as the areas where implementation has been running smoothly and had the highest outcome.

The programme is often presented as a flagship programme and has great potential to represent AAIK's programme effectiveness. Lessons from this evaluation and existing discussions within the organisation will help AAIK realise its potential and maximise its impact.

As a key conclusion the evaluator found that the response programme has largely served the intended purpose agreed in the KCDRP, although there have been some delays and obstacles. The strengths of the programme lie in AAIK's strong local presence and knowledge about communities' needs. Given the remaining timeframe there is still a significant opportunity to revisit the implementation structures and enhance the original plan so that its full potential can be reached.

Key issues the evaluator was asked to assess were:

- *Effectiveness, Efficiency, Value for Money*

In brief, the response relied on having a local presence and was most effective in areas where local presence was well established and local staff were prepared for the intervention. In terms of speed of response there is room for improvement in *preparedness,* such as ensuring an effective procurement process is in place and that funds can be devolved quickly to sites where they are most needed in order to safe lives.

It is remarkable to note that the programme has underspent or delayed spending on human resources; sufficient staff were not recruited from the start of the programme and not all existing staff were trained on humanitarian relief work. The situation added pressure to existing staff working on other programs and reduced their time to implement that work. Funds allocated for M&E and data collection have also been significantly underspent, which has resulted in challenges for both systematic analysis and progress assessment. Consequently, a lack of evidence about the implementation has challenged the team's ability to report adequately and make informed decisions on what areas to strengthen and what areas to leave out.

- *Relevance*

Given the severity of the situation in July 2011 AAIK's programme design and approach was highly appropriate and relevant. The design was well informed by AAIK's own assessments, as well as the nation-wide information produced and shared by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG). The enhanced approach of the programme built on AAIK's strength in terms of combining their ability to address structural inequalities in advocacy and policy-making as well as their well-established presence in Local Rights Programmes (LRPs) and hence strong connection with the communities in need. The planning document and the approach has been found highly relevant and is currently being replicated in other humanitarian disasters in Africa.

- *Impact*

The programme has effectively only been implemented since August 2011, and was slow to start; a number of the activities only began in 2012. As a result, while some anecdotal success stories heard during the visit to the implementation areas indicate that progress has been made, it is still too early to comment on the long-term impact of the programme or assess whether outcomes are sustainable.

For example, much of the planted seed has not yet been harvested, consumed or sold at the markets, and it is therefore too early to assess if the interventions are profitable (and thereby sustainable). Some of the interventions and capacity-building elements are likely to have contributed to a sustainable improvement of community resilience and this will become clearer as the intervention continues. Despite the short implementation period of the programme there is sufficient evidence to conclude that it was a well-planned approach that was very relevant and appropriate in theory, but needs further resource enhancement in practice in order to reveal its full potential.

1.3 Structure of the report

The evaluation report is structured so that it responds to the key questions highlighted in the ToR as well as comments on the progress the programme has made according to the KCDRP. The report contains a brief background, a section on methodology, analysis and key findings, including a SWOT analysis and an overview of missed opportunities. Finally, the report draws its conclusion and recommends suggestions for future learning and improvements of the programme. An overview of the key recommendations is also highlighted below.

1.4 Key Recommendations

Based on the assessments during the evaluation we suggest ten areas where the programme could be strengthened to enhance its full potential.

1.4.1 Programmatic recommendations

1. **Re-visit the plan, undertake updated situational analysis & work towards following an adjusted implementation plan.** The planning document and the supporting assessments contain many valuable ideas and suggestions that deserve revisiting. Due to the lack of human resources some components that were planned for have not been fully undertaken.

   We recommend revisiting the plan, while undertaking an updated situational analysis, in order to assess what areas of the plan are still relevant. Based upon this re-assessment, an adapted implementation plan can then be made to strengthen the programme. For future programming in emergency response interventions, we recommend building a flexible design that is continuously readjusted according to updated situational analysis, to ensure that the activities are always appropriate and addressing most immediate needs.

2. **Increase M&E efforts.** One of the greatest weaknesses of the programme is that it does not have identified results indicators. Moreover, no systematic baseline was undertaken prior to implementation and limited amounts of data has been collected to allow for assessing the progress of the implementation.

   We recommend the programme employs an M&E officer to systematically collect data in terms of *time finance, activities and results* (input, output, outcome and impact).

   We further recommend that to improve the M&E system the following questions are addressed in order to agree on what needs to be monitored in the programme:

   - What work and activities have been done, versus what should have been done?
   - How long has it taken, versus how long it should have taken?
   - What has it cost, versus what should it have cost?
   - What was the quality of things produced and delivered, versus what was planned?
   - How are people are reacting to the activities, versus how it was assumed they would react?
   - What benefits are people drawing from the activities, versus what was planned?

3. **Conduct a Baseline according to key indicators.** Developing a baseline was suggested in the KPRD plan but never undertaken. In

order to assess the progress of the programme we recommend undertaking a new baseline for phase 2 with outcome level indicators to monitor progress for the rest of the implementation time. A retrospective baseline is an option to better assess the contribution of phase 1.

4. **M&E training.** M&E is only effective if all staff see the value of collecting data and learning from existing activities and thereby show a willingness to contribute to the data collection and analysis. AAIK is a learning-driven organisation and improving M&E would add significant evidence to the reflections taking place and will have a strong role in enhancing program impact. A positive unintended outcome of undertaking an M&E training on the specific programme is also likely to be that every staff in the training will contemplate their role in the implementation chain and hence better understand their importance for the success of the programme.

1.4.2 Management Recommendations

5. **Strengthen Roles and Responsibilities.** The new programme manager and other new staff have high capacity and should be able to make a significant and positive difference to the programme. The full potential will only be realised if roles and responsibilities are further clarified and agreed amongst the existing team. We recommend that effort is dedicated to clarifying management structures of the programme in order to enhance the success of these new positions.

6. **Train new staff at LRP level – they are your core beneficiaries.** Currently induction is supposed to be undertaken by existing managers, but some managers already experience a significant work load and have underlined that they are not sufficiently able to support a full induction.

   We recommend training new staff in ALPS, RBA and on the programme itself to allow them to develop a deeper understanding. Undertaking such training is likely to have a direct and positive impact on the programme implementation as they will be able to explain the programme better to beneficiaries as well as become able to follow the manuals developed to deliver their activities. It could also be valuable to consider refresher training where required while moving into phase 2.

7. **Enhance programme approach.** The programme approach has been described in both interviews and in programme documentation reviewed by the evaluator. However, in practice there is a tendency amongst the implementing staff to isolate each component by which donor supports it, rather than in the context of the overall programme objectives.

For the program to be effective as a framework with assigned objectives we recommend the senior management team re-establish a collective understanding of the overall program. Reporting to individual donors will be less challenging if a solid monitoring system is put in place and the staff in the grants management team can better support specific donor requirements. Keeping implementation staff focused on the overall programme objective is likely to enhance effectiveness in programme delivery.

8. **Build National EFAST team / preparedness.** Efforts must be made to enhance AAIK emergency response preparedness including the HQ capacity to support emergency responses in the future. It is known that the drought / flood problem is cyclic and increasing in frequency and magnitude given climate change. To be more effective and develop AAIK's position, the programme needs to build organisational preparedness. We recommend developing a national EFAST team that can provide surge capacity to support programming as well as implementation during an emergency. The team could be a rolling emergency committee that oversees planning, meets to discuss developments and adjustments and any extra need for support or coordination. Given the predictability of emergencies, we also recommend establishing an emergency fund available at national level, to allow for immediate response during a crisis whilst additional funds are identified.

1.4.3 Communication Recommendations

9. **Improve knowledge management and information sharing.** With many new staff and many moving parts in a programme it is important to make sure information is available. We recommend that all staff work towards improved knowledge management and information sharing so that the entire team are informed about recent developments or reasons for adjustments.

10. **Improve communication from Kenyan HQ to LRP.** During an emergency, information flows and support needs to be easily accessible. Interviews with beneficiaries and partners have shown that communication and information flows could be improved between the Nairobi based staff, the LPR staff and the regional offices. We recommend communication tools and structures are discussed carefully amongst the team so that all are working within the same understanding of what communication is needed and how it is undertaken so that messages are shared effectively.

2. Background

Kenya has experienced a series of challenging events over the past few years that have contributed to exacerbating existing poverty and marginalisation. The 2008 election-related violence led to displacement and reinforced fragility in the poorer families. The conflict in Somalia has also increased the number of Somalis seeking refuge in Kenya. Moreover Kenya has been affected by the worldwide economic crises and the increase of food prices in recent years.

The drought worsened following repetitive shortened periods of rainfall and in July 2011 the scale of the problem was described as one of the worst droughts in over 60 years. Close to four million of people were estimated to be in need of food and roughly a third were classified as being in the 'emergency' category, according to the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC's) East Africa Crisis Real-Time Evaluation (RTE).

As many assessments have stressed, the severity of the situation is an accumulated effect of various political and environmental factors that have contributed to the scale of the problem. The social research study that AAIK commissioned during the first phase shows an interesting representation of the drought as cyclical and how climate and political problems are shortening the cycle and increasing the depth of the problem. Consequently, the drought has reinforced inequality and impacted the most vulnerable members of the community, girls in particular. As such the report also highlights how well placed the KCDRP was with its mixed immediate and long-term approach.

The general response to the situation was handled by several ministries with the Ministry of Special Programs as action focal point for disaster response. In terms of the drought, the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) is the main technical body coordinating assessments and response, working in close coordination with all involved agencies. At a sub-national level a network of District Steering Groups (DSGs) is coordinating the efforts and is bringing reporting from the local communities together for national assessments. An issue raised by the RTE of all DEC support was that, by organising the response via multiple institutions and governmental bodies, money was spread thinly and there was little opportunity for building significant institutional capacity.

The drought response were initiated to provide additional capacity to the Kenyan government where it could not cope with such a large response, and was designed to work closely together with government counterparts and coordination structures.

2.1 Background on AAIK's response

AAIK has been through some significant structural changes in recent years. The country office merged with MS Kenya (ActionAid Denmark) in 2008 and has since become a direct affiliation of ActionAid International. Following

these developments AAIK have started directly implementing programming and have been leading new developments in the area of advocacy, emergency response and building resilience.

The KCDRP was an initiative that combined a number of new approaches for AAIK. The programme is considered a flagship programme by staff because of its innovative approaches to combining emergency response with resilience building. It is also unique in its focus on coordination with government and other international organisations. Finally it uses an approach that emphasises the trend in the Kenya office to move from project implementation to a more programmatic approach.

Conceptually, the programme also highlighted some of the challenges that organisations face working from a rights based approach in the space where emergency response and development meet. It was an important discussion in the design of the project to articulate how AAIK understand resilience and how the team envisaged building it into the programme. The conceptual approach is important at all levels of implementation given the fact that it influences how the logic of the intervention is seen on the ground and what overall results the programme is working to achieve. AAIK normally operates in the area of long-term development, addressing structural inequalities, so taking on a project that brought the organisation into new areas demanded extra attention and support at all levels to ensure successful implementation.

A number of donors supported the emergency appeal including the DEC, ActionAid UK Emergency Appeal, MORAYA, AGIRE Emergency Fund, Catalan, Madrid County, UNICEF and Australia Appeal. The funding falls in to 3 categories a) bilateral funding from other Action Aid national offices, b) DEC funding and c) Appeal funding. Please find below an overview of funds provided for 2011 and 2012. The Action Aid Kenya financial team has provided the numbers.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNDING FOR 2011 - 2014 (in GBP)

Project	2011	2012
DEC	543,000	946,317
APPEAL	138,000	452,924
MORAYA	5,462	1,821
AGIRRE	157,500	52,500
CATALAN	39,383	13,128
MADRID COUNTY	39,600	13,200
UNICEF	34,662	11,554
Australia Appeal		52,500
TOTAL	**957,606**	**1,543,943**

The number of donors demonstrates an international recognition of how severe the crisis was and that donors are interested in finding more sustainable solutions. These grants did not all start at the same time and new additional donors have recently shown interest in supporting the programme further. Having multiple donors has underlined the need for a strong

programmatic monitoring framework and activity tracker to enable reporting on the specific objectives outlined in agreements with each donor.

As outlined in the original plan, the management structure of the programme was to be led by the Head of Programme and Policy with technical support from the CD, TA's, Grant Management, the national accountability team and other support functions. At local level the program was intended to be coordinated by the regional team leader for North East with technical support from regional accountants, a capacity building officer, an M&E officer, PRRO's in Isiolo, Local Rights Program Coordinator and a Programme officer in the LRPs. Not all these functions were established from the outset of the program and some functions are yet to be filled. Because of the large scale of the program, the political importance, number of stakeholders and importance for AAIK, the national board were also involved in the designing phase of the programme.

The programme was designed with assistance from the EFAST and the International Emergencies and Crisis Team (IECT) in July and August 2011. The timing fell outside the normal timeframe for programming and was taken on in addition to the current portfolio of work. The additional programme element allowed AAIK to move from project approach to programme approach and also brought various funding streams together within one area of focus.

The programme has at the time of this evaluation been running for 8-10 months, and its implementation is still being developed. It has been managed mainly by the Technical Advisor with support from Head of Program and Policy, the CD and the Head of Grants with a strong connection to regional accountants and local LRP managers. In the beginning of 2012 new initiatives were undertaken to engage a program manager and more staff at the local level to help with implementing the work. The heavy workload has meant that some areas such as national coordination have been less of a priority and some of the interventions have focused on '*what is possible given the resources available*' rather than '*how would we like to do it*'.

In October 2011 the National Accountability Team was initiated. The group was made up of key programme staff from senior management (team leader, technical advisor and head of grants) and was initiated to look at accountability, assess risk and oversee the programme. The team has only met once so far, in April 2012. The International Emergencies and Crisis Team (IECT) provides additional support to the programme for example by reviewing the risk matrix and engaging with donor reputation management. The IECT team has been engaged to ensure appropriate adjustments to the programme.

In terms of financial management and reporting, the programme has been managed so that finances are consolidated every month as well as in annual reporting. The budgets are activity driven whereby activities can be attributed to specific budget lines and assessment phases can identify where activities have not progressed adequately by looking at budget line spend. Some areas of the programme have significantly underspent because of a range of factors

including those out of the programme's control, for example in Isiolo where the security situation worsened significantly, thereby posing a risk to staff. The donor requirements vary so reporting has been handled individually according to each specific donor.

3. Methodology and facilitation

The ToR of this evaluation was developed in collaboration between ActionAid International UK, AAIK and the IECT team. Integrity Research and Consultancy responded to the tender and was selected in April 2012. The procurement and planning was well managed even though it took place during an unusually busy period and during the rainy season.

The rain caused some difficulties in the field and prohibited the evaluation team to visit all intended programme areas, but when visits were not possible thorough conversations were had with staff about the areas in order to compensate for the lack of visibility. First hand observation of the damage caused by rain in the villages served as an important contextual point for the evaluation demonstrating how challenging it can be to operate in the remote areas.

Interviews with local staff were facilitated by the technical advisor and other HQ staff, and on most occasions the consultant was introduced to the interviewees and led the interviews. On some occasions the facilitator stepped in for the sake of clarification. Meetings with beneficiaries and other stakeholders such as government representatives were facilitated by AAIK staff and, in most cases, their local point of contact was present in the meetings.

By structuring the meetings in this way the team created a good atmosphere for dialogue, where conversations could take place relatively easily. The team always underlined that there was no right or wrong answers and emphasised that the evaluation was to be used to adjust the programme and would not directly influence funds. We recommend this method for future reviews. The team also tried to have more informal conversations with the key staff while in the vehicle or between meetings, helping nuance our understanding of the implementation of the programme.

Special thanks are owed to Yusuf Artan for facilitating field visits and establishing contacts for receiving our visit. Also a special thanks Rachel Amondi facilitating the trip to Narok and to Boniface Mugo for making the long journeys safe and restful. The new programme manager Ruth Amatalo were also invaluable for the evaluation given her curiosity of the programme and continuously drawing comparative examples with other programmes and raising further questions when the evaluator was running out!

For the review we visited Narok, Marafa, Tangulbei and Isiolo, which together represent a new LRP, one that is five years old and one that is being phased out, as well as Isiolo where AAIK is the lead implementation agency working

with WFP but not via the LRP's. These variations provided valuable background information for the evaluation and showed the importance of presence and relationships in the communities where the programme is being implemented.

Some key staff such as M&E officer and the Head of Programme, were only met during the final debrief and unfortunately the Team Leader was not available for meetings during the evaluation. A full list of people interviewed can be found in Annex 1.

4. Key findings and analysis

In this section of the report we describe our key findings and analyse progress of the programme according to the objectives stipulated in the ToR. Based on our initial debrief with key staff in Nairobi on the 11th of May 2012 we have agreed also to comment on the progress according to activities planned for in the KCDRP.

4.1 Progress Assessment against the plan

The Country Strategy for AAIK 2012-2017 has three main pillars – Empowerment, Solidarity and Campaigning. Within those pillars AAIK is working to achieve four strategic objectives: *rights for women and children; access and control over land and natural resources; accountability at all levels* and finally *disaster management and resilience building.*

Thematically, the KCDRP is a programme supporting AAIK be successful on strategic objective four while simultaneously working through the three pillars and including core activities in its approach to the response (i.e. building resilience by addressing the structural inequalities and barriers the most vulnerable are exposed to and that are excluding them for overcoming disasters). As such, the KCDRP is designed to build on the strengths of AAIK approach while addressing urgent needs.

Given the focus on improving immediate needs as well as addressing structural inequalities the programme is closely connected to thematic areas of ActionAid's work. As such success in the KDRP programme is likely to contribute positively in other programmes and vice versa. One particular area that KDRP is both directly and indirectly addressing is women's rights, which is ActionAid's overarching focus, in some LRP's women's rights is directly addressed in others it is implicitly addressed when focussing on the most vulnerable groups.

The programme was developed in close coordination with the Kenyan Government and with other NGO's and international organisations and as such the response to the drought has been praised as an example of good practice (i.e. in the DEC RTE). In this evaluation we only assess the activities AAIK has implemented, but it is worth mentioning that the coordination efforts

and the coordinated strategising and support AAIK has offered is remarkable and an inspiration for responses elsewhere. The coordination efforts demonstrate the need for working on drought response at a political level that has been an integrated part of the response, to engage with the government to improve the constitution with regards to protecting rights for all of the Kenyan people.

4.2 Innovations of the KCDRP

It has been highlighted in interviews that the programme was a new approach for AAIK and that it was seen as a flagship programme for how a rights based approach could be integrated in a emergency response while also contributing to building long term resilience. The plan was developed during an intensive planning phase with significant consultation at all levels in the organisations and participatory needs assessments with the target beneficiaries.

The plan had some innovative ideas such as evidence based programming, the activity input tracker, enhancing women's leader ship in resilience building, undertaking social studies to inform the work and so on. The design of the programme was informed by situation reports from the LRPs as well as documents produced in national coordination bodies such as the short and long term rains assessment. These documents provided great situational analysis and served as a strong base for informing the programme. The overall goal with the programme was to build resilience to decrease the impact of drought amongst people living in poverty and exclusion as well as to break the drought/flood cycle in the intervention areas.

Programmatically, the KDRP programme was broken down into six objectives, which were addressed by planning for 18 outcome areas. It was assumed that these outcome areas, broken down into specific interventions would contribute to achieving the six objectives and ultimately build resilience of the communities.

In the below figure the intervention logic is presented as a theory of change of the programme by selecting a few of the interventions, outcomes and objectives to illustrate the logic. The programme however is built on a number of assumptions on how the interventions will lead to the intended outcome and ultimately help achieve the objective. It is worth revisiting these assumptions and assess to what extent they hold true. If not, explore *why* and rebuild the intervention approach on success stories of what is working according to the plan and what is not. This iterative process highlights *how* the programme is achieving success and reinforces success as part of the programme process.

4.3 Implementation of the programme

Based on the information gathered from reports and interviews, not all of the interventions that were laid out in the plan have been implemented. The education baseline assessing the impact of the drought on education and the bee-keeping project are two examples of activities that have not taken place. The main message however, is not to point out what has not happened but to look at why certain activities have not been implemented. The plan was unrealistically ambitious given the resources available and staff allocated to implement the programme. Moreover, some of the activities that were planned were not actually relevant when it came to implementation. A key finding is that there is no documentation of how or why the decisions were made about which activities were implemented and which were not.

In the following section we assess progress according to each of the six objectives laid out in the response plan:

Objective 1: 'Support poor and excluded people and their institutions to address and secure their basic needs and rights'

Progress: Interventions have, according to school staff interviewed, improved the enrolment in schools and enhanced child security by giving the children access to safe spaces to continue their education. In some implementation areas the poorest families have also received some supplementary food. Water trucking has taken place to augment water supply during the drought and training on water management has been implemented. Initiatives have been taken to encourage women to lead educational and other organisations with the purpose of raising demands on quality of services from the government.

However the current monitoring mechanism and documentation fails to capture the impact these activities had on the overall objective. For example, how does increased enrolment increase resilience? How is the water management training being used towards building resilience?

Objective 2: 'To promote income and livelihood diversification among people living in poverty and exclusions in ASALs'

Progress: Destocking by slaughtering animals that are not likely to survive the drought and distributing the meat to the communities was not an activity found in any of the four visited implementation areas. It was however explained by staff as a very successful way of helping families to get access to meat in other LRPs. AAIK has as such increased livelihoods, AAIK has also contributed to livelihood diversification by handing out improved seeds and providing training via government experts on how to diversify farming. With

some new seeds such as with sorghum it was noticed that their introduction was not contributing to improved nutrition because the communities are not eating the yield. This was either because they didn't like the taste or because they didn't value it as food. The seeds were introduced primarily because they are easy to grow and more drought resistant. The communities did stress however that they would eat the crops if they had to during a drought.

In Marafa and Isiolo, capacity building and water management had been key components of the programme and despite the continued struggle for irrigation, the activities were described as gradually but positively contributing to the harvest in the communities. It is too soon to say whether the interventions are sustainable and would continue were AAIK or the government support to be withdrawn.

A key component of the programme was also to create a safe space for women and raise awareness of the fact that house-work is also work and needs to be recognized as such by the male members of the community. The programme in the well-established LRP's appeared to have had significant success in this approach.

Objective 3: 'Support community-lead DRR and climate change adaption'

Progress: Building resilience ties closely to political crisis management. Enhancing community-led DRR and climate change adaption is a way to help communities to build resilience regardless of political marginalisation. Interviews made it clear that the marginalised and excluded are continuously struggling to be heard by local decision makers. AAIK are playing a key role in facilitating their voice in drought response and resilience planning committees. While contributing to changing power structures takes time, AAIK has used their role to encourage government representatives to engage the communities in their planning and incorporate female leadership. As such AAIK has contributed to building the capacity of government representatives at a local level to address structural issues caused by the drought as well as more immediate community needs.

Objective 4: 'Facilitate women's participation and leadership in water and natural resource management and other decision making processes'

Progress: Objective 4 is closely linked with the progress described under objective 3, but it was particularly evident in the field visits that AAIK has advocated hard for female representation in the relief committees and that women were represented in the community-based management organs. In this way AAIK had enhanced women's participation in decision-making.

Changing power structures and decision-making is not something that happens over-night, but in the LRP areas where AAIK has had a long

presence it was emphasized by various external stakeholders that women's status in the communities had changed. This progress cannot be attributed entirely to the drought response programme, but it appears that the programme has enhanced the positive trend.

There was a high participation of women from the communities in many of the irrigation projects and agricultural trainings. The extent to which women benefit from the eventual profit from sales of crops was not evident from interviews.

Objective 5: 'Enhance protection for poor and excluded women and girls vulnerable to experiencing violence'

Progress: AAIK's strong focus on women and girls' rights and protection are evident from this programme. The sensitization and awareness raising that is taking place in the LRPs (particularly in Tangulbei) demonstrated that women are starting to speak up about their problems, and in women's groups, they are finding a safe space to share issues of concern with other women. The problems around women's marginalized position in the communities are structural however and deeply rooted and will therefore take time to combat fully.

In terms of attribution of the changes happening in the area of protection this programme can be described as contributing to a wider process of addressing these issues. However other programmes AAIK are implementing are tackling the issues much more directly as their primary focus.

Objective 6: 'To support communities to monitor and advocate for improved delivery of services and assistance by government, donors and other duty bearers'

Progress: The programme has contributed to AAIK's on-going transparency initiative through a number of different ways. For example, inviting key stakeholders including community members to AAIK programme design planning sessions is a tool to enhance transparency and make the communities aware of the support they are entitled to. The SMS initiative is also a pilot tool AAIK has used as a type of feedback mechanism to hold the service delivering parties to account in terms of quality of food and timeliness.

The project has contributed to building the communities' capacity to create a political voice for demanding the services they are entitled to. AAIK has been contributing to the trend but full transparency of service delivery and government accountability is a much wider issue across Kenya upon which AAIK can only have a limited impact.

Policy Work; At the policy level AAIK has had some significant achievements in improving emergency response and coordination. Together with Oxfam and World Vision, AAIK has engaged with the government throughout the period. AAIK is a member of a subcommittee under the KFSG and has helped to focus the government in its response. This work has led to the signing of the Nairobi Declaration on Drought and the subsequent establishment of the National Drought Management Authority through an act of parliament. It is assumed that this authority will enhance preparedness for future droughts and contribute to limiting the consequences of future crisis. The work has also led to the development of child protection minimum standards in emergencies and other advocacy achievements.

It is evident that as an advocacy organisation AAIK has made a strong contribution to this achievement. It is yet to be seen how the government will follow these initiatives up in practice.

4.4 Monitoring Progress

The activity tracker tool was developed to track activity implementation and when used on a daily basis is very useful. The tool enhances transparency and allows other staff to get a quick overview of what activities have been implemented where.

A principle challenge with the programme implementation has been that complimentary indicators (both at outcome and output level) are not available. The implementation team has been unable to monitor progress both in terms of activities implemented (which the activity tracker compensated for), but also in terms of results achieved as a consequence of the implemented activities. In the recommendations we give some concrete suggestions as to how monitoring can be strengthened.

4.5 The minimum standards

The drought response programme contained a list of minimum standards that the implementation of the programme should adhere to. Most were followed; vigilance committees were set up, transparency boards were established, the communities were involved and so on. While many of these activities have been followed it was not always clear how it had contributed to a more successful implementation. For example, with regards to the transparency boards, programme staff rarely explained how to use them and community members never referred to them.

It would be worth revisiting the 'non-negotiables' and discussing amongst the team how they are contributing to achieving the goals of the programme and whether some components could be left out if they are not found helpful.

5. Assessment against stipulated objectives

5.1 Outcome assessment

The intended outcome of phase 1 of the programme was to save lives, bring relief aid to the communities affected by drought and improve livelihoods. During all interviews and conversations with beneficiaries and partners it was clear that the programme has made a difference and has contributed to saving lives and improving livelihoods in the intervention areas. It also became clear that some of the assistance was late due to slow procurement, lack of stock in the markets and poor accessibility to the local areas. The programme has worked best in the well-established LRPs. Given the lack of a systematic monitoring system assessing the results of the intervention it is challenging to assess where the programme has had the most impact. In order to improve assessment of where and how the programme contributes most significantly to change systematic outcome monitoring is needed.

Phase 2 had only just been initiated when this review was undertaken and components of phase 1 were still being carried out in some areas where the intervention had been delayed. The components of phase 2 are much closer to AAIK's normal programme approach in that it is more typically developmental work. In terms of building resilience there appears to be most potential for change when the programme is built around already established livelihoods, i.e. enhancing communities' ability to improve their livelihoods by building on what they are already doing and have been doing for generations. Another area that the evaluator was not able to assess, but that received many positive comments by staff and partners, was the FFA programme in Isiolo. If the FFA programme in Isiolo does prove to be one of the more successful components it could be interesting to look at replication and scaling up.

The evaluator is confident that the programme will be successful if the necessary staffing is completed and management responsibilities are discussed and clarified. However, in order to be able to assess the outcome of the programme in the future we suggest that a new and more detailed baseline is undertaken, and that a new monitoring framework is developed that includes careful calculated results indicators. The current monitoring is unsystematic and is not assessing results, it is tracking finance and activities but not time and change. In order to assess how the programme is contributing to change and to understand where the AAIK intervention is strongest and weakest, results monitoring and indicators needs to be developed so that those lessons can be learned.

5.2 Speed of response – all about *preparedness*

As mentioned in the introduction, the programme was started as a response to the announcement of a crisis situation in Kenya. AAIK allocated significant staffing and resources to engage in the response and also in the design of the programme. The EFAST team was engaged to support on communication and both the senior management and the national accountability team were

engaged in designing a comprehensive implementation plan. Stakeholders were consulted, participatory needs assessments were undertaken and the response was carefully planned for during July 2011. The programme document is the result of these processes and underlines the strong starting point of the response.

Moving from planning to implementation was challenging for AAIK. In the areas where the LRP's were well established and experienced staff were managing, the programme ran well, however in the new LRP areas and in areas where there was other challenges the response was slow. In the RTE of all the DEC funded programmes the report found that many of the development agencies that took on the emergency response continued 'with business as usual' and did not enhance a emergency response approach. AAIK also fell in this category. The need for emergency procedures and having the organisation prepared for a speedy response is not yet in place as a whole. Some of the components highlighted in interviews as having slowed down the process are:

- *Procurement;* The standard procurement procedures used by AAIK are configured to enhance capacity building of local communities by aiming to ensure that appropriate products are procured at the right price and in a fair way. These processes are enhancing transparency and local ownership and are admirable examples of well-designed development work. However in an emergency faster procedures need to be established that place the emphasis on speedy and efficient distribution.

- *HR;* Getting new staff to the LRP's as well as organising the response from a staffing perspective at HQ level took time. It was highlighted that other programs suffered as a result and some staff had to do work that was outside of their agreed areas of responsibilities. Having clear roles and responsibilities and having the right people to do the right jobs will enhance the effectiveness of future responses.

5.3 Management Arrangements

Turn over of staff in key positions and structural changes were on-going in AAIK in the period the programme was designed and implemented. The changes caused instability and impacted on the implementation of the drought response programme. The changes in the organisation meant that the programme did not at all times get the attention it needed given the size and complexities of the approach. As mentioned above too few human resources were allocated and management structures were unclear in the beginning of the response.

However, re-staffing both at HQ, regional and LRP level has now been initiated and provides a great opportunity for revisiting the plan and enhancing the potential of the programme. To allow the new staff to be successful they need training in AAIK's specific approach to emergency response and in

general programming, in order to understand the programme and be responsible for how they are contributing to enhancing the overall goal of the programme.

5.4 ALPS

The Accountability Learning and Planning System (ALPS) provides a strong framework for the M&E and planning system that embraces the core values of AAIK's approach to development. In theory, the approach is suitable for the context in which the drought response programme is being implemented. In particular, the approach ensures that vulnerable groups and women are involved in programming and seems to be followed to a large extent in the more established LRP's. Unfortunately, not all staff are trained in the approach and thus many do not follow the framework. There is also a challenge to the approach in circumstances where the activities are designed and coordinated in close cooperation with partners who may not have the same approach. Insufficient effort has been put into enhancing stakeholders' understanding of the AAIK approach. This dilemma is likely to be a challenge in all circumstances where the success of a programme is only partly reliant on the implementing organisation and to a large extent influenced by other partners such as other NGO's or the government of Kenya and their local representatives.

5.5 Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA)

The AAIK-developed Emergency Response Guidelines and the general HRBA manual provide apt conceptual frameworks for working from a rights-based approach in an emergency response context. AAIK has been brave in taking on this approach and there is a very high rights awareness approach embedded in the working routines of the most experienced staff. However, training in rights-based emergency response needs to be further enhanced and embraced by all staff at all levels of implementation to ensure that the organisation is prepared and equipped to undertake timely rights-based responses in the future. The delays in the response means that the research did not find clear evidence of how the HRBA works real time. It would be worth assessing in other emergencies to draw lessons from the approach.

5.6 Partnerships

The drought response programme was developed in close coordination with the main stakeholders and the Kenyan government ministries and was replicated at regional and local level in the implementation areas. Overall the approach seems to have been well coordinated and no noticeable overlap of interventions was found during the evaluation. While not all partners were met, the effort to coordinate is valuable for future learning and is likely to enhance the sustainability of future efforts. Part of the approach for AAIK has been to educate partners and the government on its specific approach and identify common areas of interest whilst compromising on some approaches

which may be different in other organisations. While some forums for shared learning have been developed, the implementation team has not always had the human resources to cover these meetings. With increasing support in terms of personnel working on the programme it is recommended that the networking opportunities are further enhanced. In particular in the area of developing coordinated M&E frameworks it would be additive for AAIK and help all implementing actors to assess how they contribute to the overall response to the crisis.

At a policy level it was highlighted by partners that AAIK has a strong voice and position, where some partners may not agree on the specifics of the approach they value AAIK's efforts and underline that they are making a difference in improving policies in the area of emergency response.

5.7 Cost effectiveness

Assessing cost effectiveness has been identified by AAIK as an important element of the evaluation. However, the monitoring system and design of the programme does not allow for a detailed analysis. As is highlighted in the recommendations, the monitoring system does not track results so, as such, assessing the outcome against implemented activities is not possible to do systematically.

5.8 Downward accountability

Accountability to the rights bearer is an important value for AAIK and was often highlighted by staff in the field. Ensuring downward accountability in an emergency context is challenging as decisions need to happen much faster. During interviews with the beneficiaries some said that they were not always aware when relief aid was coming and that it was often delayed. Whether this comment can be attributed to lack of communication from AAIK is difficult to ascertain, but improved communications to ensure accountability and transparency in the emergency response context is likely to improve the impact of the initiative. A separate mechanism addressing accountability separately from general implementation could be valuable rather than relying on existing relationships with the communities. The SMS system piloted in Isiolo appeared to have great potential for improving downwards accountability and has recently been evaluated. Depending on the findings of that report, it could be worthwhile testing the approach more systematically in other implementation areas to further enhance downwards accountability.

5.9 Coordinated policy engagement

According to senior management and technical advisors, the advocacy efforts linked to the drought response and resilience building are having a significant impact. Evidence supporting this opinion is indicated in terms of passing bills and learning from the response at an international level, where the 'Kenyan Approach' was going to be replicated in the Senegal emergency response and components will be highlighted in the Rio Climate Change Conference.

Developing a monitoring system for the uptake of advocacy efforts and monitoring the implementation of these results would add value to AAIK in developing a unique position amongst other international NGOs.

5.10 Successes and best practices

AAIK has had most success in the response in areas where they have a well-established presence and a strong relationship with the local community and local stakeholders. During an interview with the local project coordinator in Narok, he explained how important it was to understand why livestock (and in particular cows) are of such value to the Masai. Having a local member of the community as an AAIK coordinator is likely to be one of the main reasons why the programme has had some success. Engaging staff who are also members of the community constitutes a sustainable approach and the best way to have an interface and ensure dialogue with the communities. In another intervention area it was interesting to see how the program engaging women and enhancing women's rights was effective because of the involvement of the KPRD. At a local level having a significant presence and running multiple programs has a multiplying effect and contributes positively to the success of each program. It makes attribution of the change more challenging but appears to be successful and provides a holistic approach from which all programs can leverage.

Some interviews highlighted components of the FFA programme in Isiolo as particularly successful. WFP and other LRP areas have tried to replicate that success. It would be an interesting exercise to understand why it is working particularly well and what the contributing factors are that have enhanced the success. In Narok restocking was underlined as the most successful component of the programme to help the pastoralists overcome the drought, not for nutrition purposes but to restore pride in the communities and bridge the challenging times to engage in trade easier after the drought. In particular restocking of hybrid livestock was seen as a successful intervention by the beneficiaries during interviews.

The SMS tool is also a success story that is worth highlighting. Although the SMS programme element does not save lives directly, it does help the communities to understand where the assistance is being given and plan because they know what they will be receiving, where and when.

Identifying the most successful components of the programme will be easier once a baseline has been undertaken and a results monitoring system has been developed, because there will then be a starting point against which to hold achievements and an ability to judge where an outcome is most significant. Analysing what circumstances contributed to that success will allow AAIK to better inform future programming.

5.11 Challenges

Below are some of the key challenges that the AAIK programme has faced:

- A turbulent period with many organisational and personnel changes;
- Confusion of roles and responsibilities;
- Taking on new staff took time and caused implementation delays;
- Procurement processes that were not prepared for emergency response and on occasion delayed delivery of relief;
- A high work load that prevented the training of new staff from being fully embraced and has resulted in them not fully understanding the AAIK approach, or their specific roles in the programme's implementation;
- AAIK has an impressive approach to reflection and learning, but monitoring of results is not being captured systematically. This causes challenges for reporting and the program lacks an evidence-based understanding of progress and of strengths and weaknesses;
- Financial expenditure oversight was not initiated until late in the day and in general data is not compiled in one place.

While there have been some significant challenges that need to be learned from, significant efforts have also been made to overcome the challenges. Undertaking this evaluation and using it as a tool in forward planning is one such example. Employing new staff and scaling the approach up in some LRPs is another. The evaluator is impressed by the level of reflection and willingness to learn in the organisation. This evaluation provides a good starting point to revisit the original plan, reassess the assumptions in the theories of change and adjust the programme to the current circumstances in order to enhance its potential and move implementation forwards.

5.12 Missed Opportunities

The programme has only been running for the first phase, hence there is still a real window for the program to address the shortcomings in the initial phase of implementation. Stepping into the second phase of the programme provides an opportunity for AAIK to develop its ability to respond well to future emergencies. As highlighted elsewhere in this report, building communities' resilience is supported by building preparedness, and the same can be applied to AAIK at all levels. Adequate response to future crises and therefore organisational preparedness as a whole should be a focus for improvement.

Another important factor to ensure the success of the second phase of the programme is to revisit the plans and to make a new situational analysis, since the context has changed and many areas are now flooded rather than suffering from drought. Revisiting the plan and redesigning the activities according to the actual needs is a necessary step to successful implementation of the second phase.

Strengths

- Strong local knowledge via LRP's
- High Capacity HQ staff
- Good cooperation with government at local level
- Strong Advocacy Expertise
- EFAST team to support in outbreak
- Planning & Needs assessments
- Reflections & adjustments

Weakness

- Poor training of new staff & poor emergency understanding amongst existing staff 'Business as Usual'
- Delayed Staffing
- Unclear responsibilities at management level
- Structural Changes & Unrealistic demands on HQ staff
- Poor M&E
- Inflexible and reactive donors, causes delays in responses and inflexible designs that can not be adjusted to emerging crisis and prevention.

Opportunities

- New Phase & New Staff at local and HQ level is an opportunity to get the programme up and running
- New Emergency Experience in the team is an opportunity to develop the AAIK emergency approach more fully for future interventions
- Learning from what is going well (if a baseline is undertaken) examples that could be explored sms system for beneficiary accountability, FFA success stories, cost effectiveness and what works well for AAIK / what are we best at?
- Using this area of work is an opportunity to engage in new ways with partners and donors to discuss lessons and approaches to drought response and resilience building.

Threats

- If new staff are not trained on the approach and aims with the KCDRP they are not likely to be able to contribute to strengthening the programme as intended.
- If management and decision making are not clear the programme will continue to move at a slow pace.
- If M&E are not improved reporting later will be increasingly problematic.

6. Conclusion

The KCDRP is a large programme with a new approach to bringing together emergency response and resilience building in one framework to break the circle of drought by addressing both immediate needs and structural vulnerabilities. The process of implementing humanitarian rather than development activities has been, and will continue to be, a great learning curve for AAIK International Kenya while enhancing 'preparedness'.

The project has been successful in the areas where AAIK has a strong local presence and experienced staff, but the programme has been slow in its response where local connections are weaker and staff have not been sufficiently trained and supported.

Moving into the coming years of implementing phase 2 provides a great opportunity for AAIK to learn about its own role and added value in the emergency cycle. Building more systematic assessments as part of an on-going situation analysis in order to adjust activities according to the contextual developments will be of critical value. Furthermore, a solid results-based monitoring framework with clear milestones assessing the change that the programme is contributing to will allow it to become the flagship programme it was intended to be.

AAIK has a strong tradition of reflection and a commendable willingness to learn from mistakes, improve future work and share learning's with others. The experience that the KCDRP offers can be greatly enhanced by continuing the culture of promoting curiosity and innovation by improving assessment, increasing evidence gathered from the field and using this input to inform continued implementation.

In the following section we provide 10 recommendations to AAIK that we believe could help the KPRD implementation team to enhance the potential for success in the programme:

7. Recommendations for improvement and future learning

7.1 Programmatic recommendations

11. **Re-visit the plan, undertake updated situational analysis & work towards following an adjusted implementation plan.** The planning document and the supporting assessments contain many valuable ideas and suggestions that deserve revisiting. Due to the lack of human resources some components that were planned for have not been fully undertaken.

    We recommend revisiting the plan, while undertaking an updated situational analysis, in order to assess what areas of the plan are still relevant. Based upon this re-assessment, an adapted implementation plan can then be made to strengthen the programme. For future

programming in emergency response interventions, we recommend building a flexible design that is continuously readjusted according to updated situational analysis, to ensure that the activities are always appropriate and addressing most immediate needs.

12. **Increase M&E efforts.** One of the greatest weaknesses of the programme is that it does not have identified results indicators. Moreover, no systematic baseline was undertaken prior to implementation and limited amounts of data has been collected to allow for assessing the progress of the implementation.

We recommend the programme employs an M&E officer to systematically collect data in terms of *time finance, activities and results* (input, output, outcome and impact).

We further recommend that to improve the M&E system the following questions are addressed in order to agree on what needs to be monitored in the programme:

- What work and activities have been done, versus what should have been done?
- How long has it taken, versus how long it should have taken?
- What has it cost, versus what should it have cost?
- What was the quality of things produced and delivered, versus what was planned?
- How are people are reacting to the activities, versus how it was assumed they would react?
- What benefits are people drawing from the activities, versus what was planned?

13. **Conduct a Baseline according to key indicators.** Developing a baseline was suggested in the KPRD plan but never undertaken. In order to assess the progress of the programme we recommend undertaking a new baseline for phase 2 with outcome level indicators to monitor progress for the rest of the implementation time. A retrospective baseline is an option to better assess the contribution of phase 1.

14. **M&E training.** M&E is only effective if all staff see the value of collecting data and learning from existing activities and thereby show a willingness to contribute to the data collection and analysis. AAIK is a learning-driven organisation and improving M&E would add significant evidence to the reflections taking place and will have a strong role in enhancing program impact. A positive unintended outcome of undertaking an M&E training on the specific programme is also likely to be that every staff in the training will contemplate their role in the implementation chain and hence better understand their importance for the success of the programme.

7.2 Management Recommendations

15. **Strengthen Roles and Responsibilities.** The new programme manager and other new staff have high capacity and should be able to make a significant and positive difference to the programme. The full potential will only be realised if roles and responsibilities are further clarified and agreed amongst the existing team. We recommend that effort is dedicated to clarifying management structures of the programme in order to enhance the success of these new positions.

16. **Train new staff at LRP level – they are your core beneficiaries.** Currently induction is supposed to be undertaken by existing managers, but some managers already experience a significant work load and have underlined that they are not sufficiently able to support a full induction.

    We recommend training new staff in ALPS, RBA and on the programme itself to allow them to develop a deeper understanding. Undertaking such training is likely to have a direct and positive impact on the programme implementation as they will be able to explain the programme better to beneficiaries as well as become able to follow the manuals developed to deliver their activities. It could also be valuable to consider refresher training where required while moving into phase 2.

17. **Enhance programme approach.** The programme approach has been described in both interviews and in programme documentation reviewed by the evaluator. However, in practice there is a tendency amongst the implementing staff to isolate each component by which donor supports it, rather than in the context of the overall programme objectives.

    For the program to be effective as a framework with assigned objectives we recommend the senior management team re-establish a collective understanding of the overall program. Reporting to individual donors will be less challenging if a solid monitoring system is put in place and the staff in the grants management team can better support specific donor requirements. Keeping implementation staff focused on the overall programme objective is likely to enhance effectiveness in programme delivery.

18. **Build National EFAST team / preparedness.** Efforts must be made to enhance AAIK emergency response preparedness including the HQ capacity to support emergency responses in the future. It is known that the drought / flood problem is cyclic and increasing in frequency and magnitude given climate change. To be more effective and develop AAIK's position, the programme needs to build organisational preparedness. We recommend developing a national EFAST team that can provide surge capacity to support programming as well as implementation during an emergency. The team could be a rolling

emergency committee that oversees planning, meets to discuss developments and adjustments and any extra need for support or coordination. Given the predictability of emergencies, we also recommend establishing an emergency fund available at national level, to allow for immediate response during a crisis whilst additional funds are identified.

7.3 Communication Recommendations

19. **Improve knowledge management and information sharing.** With many new staff and many moving parts in a programme it is important to make sure information is available. We recommend that all staff work towards improved knowledge management and information sharing so that the entire team are informed about recent developments or reasons for adjustments.

20. **Improve communication from Kenyan HQ to LRP.** During an emergency, information flows and support needs to be easily accessible. Interviews with beneficiaries and partners have shown that communication and information flows could be improved between the Nairobi based staff, the LPR staff and the regional offices. We recommend communication tools and structures are discussed carefully amongst the team so that all are working within the same understanding of what communication is needed and how it is undertaken so that messages are shared effectively.

ANNEX 1: People Met

ActionAid UK

1. Sarah Woodcock
Emergency Funding Manager

ActionAid International Kenya HQ

1. Jacob
Head of Finance

2. John Abuya
International Thematic Programme Manager
IECT

3. Philip Kilonzo
Technical Advisor – Livelihoods

4. Rachel Amondi
CBHA Trainee

5. Ruth Amatello
Programme Manager

6. Soeren Bjerregaard
Communication Officer HQ Nairobi / MS

7. Susan
Head of Grants

8. Tennyson Williams
Country Director

9. Yusuf Artan
Technical Advisor – Emergency Response and Resilience

National Partners
1. James Kamunge
WFP

Narok
1. LRP Assistant & Financial Manager
2. Masai Womens Group
3. Agricultural Advisor at the local government office
4. Food Distribution Sight
5. School Management Group

6. Parents Group
7. Food Distribution Beneficiaries
8. Livestocking Beneficiaries
9. Livestock assessment

Marafa
1. LRP Manager
2. KCDRP Assistant
3. Agricultural Community Group
4. Womens Group
5. Irrigation Community Group
6. Developing Poultry Group
7. Resilience Group
8. Agricultural Advisors in Local Government

Tangulbai
1. LRA Manager
2. KCDRP Officer
3. Regional Accountant
4. School Management
5. Parents Group
6. Local Chief
7. Borehole Site
8. Resilience Committee
9. Vulnerable Communities Members
10. Local Government Representatives
11. Womens Group

Isiolo
1. Regional Office Staff
2. Regional Accountant
3. SMS Project Manager
4. Food Distribution Beneficiaries
5. FFA Group
6. Food Distribution Site
7. Food Storage Workers
8. DSG Manager
9. District Officer

ANNEX 2: Documents Reviewed

- AAIK DCDRP
- AAIK Drought Emergency Concept
- AAIK DDR and CC Social Action Research
- AAIK Drought Assessment Report July 2011
- ActionAid Cost Effectiveness in Programme Cycle
- ActionAid Efficiency Questions in Programme Cycle
- ALPS
- DEC – plans, reports and budgets
- Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) – East Africa Crisis Appeal, 'Kenya Real-Time Evaluation Report', January 2012.
- Draft AAIK 3-year Integrated Planning Framework 2012-2-14
- Drought Response Oversight Meeting Minutes
- Emergency Response Guidelines
- HRBA Manual
- Kenya Sit Rep No 2 2011
- KCDRP Budget 23082011
- Project Progress Reports
- Project Proposals
- Programme Performance Report North East
- Short Rains Assessment Report, Government of Kenya
- Tangulbei Sit Rep for February 2010
- ToRs for EA & Horn Drought Study

END OF REPORT

LISTEN
COMPREHEND
RECOMMEND